Loevy referred to a similar point with regard to sections 4 to 8 of the agreement, recalling that the British and French practiced „Ottoman colonial development“ and that this experience served as a roadmap for subsequent war negotiations.  While Khalidi examined the negotiations of Great Britain and France in 1913 and 1914 on the Homs-Baghdad railway line, as well as their agreements with Germany, in other regions, as a „clear basis“ for their subsequent spheres of influence under the agreement.  The agreement was first directly used as the basis for the Anglo-French modus vivendi of 1918, which provided a framework for the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration in the Levant. More generally, it was to lead indirectly to the subsequent partition of the Ottoman Empire after the Ottoman defeat of 1918. Shortly after the war, French Palestine and Mosul ceded to the British. Warrants in the Levant and Mesopotamia were awarded at the San Remo conference in April 1920, according to the Sykes-Picot framework; The British mandate for Palestine ran until 1948, the British mandate for Mesopotamia was to be replaced by a similar treaty with compulsory Iraq, and the French mandate for Syria and Lebanon lasted until 1946. The anatolic parts of the agreement were attributed by the Treaty of Sevres of August 1920; But these ambitions were thwarted by the Turkish War of Independence of 1919-23 and the Subsequent Treaty of Lausanne. The following eleven points included the formal agreements between Great Britain, France and Russia. The agreement effectively divided the Ottoman provinces outside the Arabian Peninsula into territories of control and influence of the United Kingdom and France. The countries controlled by Great Britain and France were divided by the Sykes-Picot line.  The agreement that gave Britain control of present-day southern Israel and Palestine, Jordan and southern Iraq, as well as another small area including the ports of Haifa and Acre, to allow access to the Mediterranean.    France should control southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.  In May, Clayton Balfour stated that, in response to the indication that the agreement had been shaken, „it had allowed a significant revision to be required in view of the changes in the situation since the development of the agreement,“ but that he nevertheless considered that „the agreement is in any case in principle.“ George Curzon said: The great powers remain committed to the Organic Settlement Agreement, regarding governance and non-interference in the affairs of the Maronite, Orthodox Christian, Druze and Muslim communities with regard to the Beirut Vilayet of June 1861 and September 1864, adding that the rights granted to France in present-day Syria and parts of Turkey under sykes-Picot are incompatible with this agreement.
 The agreement is seen by many as a turning point in Western and Arab relations. She denied the promises made by the United Kingdom to the Arabs concerning a national Arab homeland in the region of Syria in exchange for British support for the Ottoman Empire. The agreement was made public with others on 23 November 1917 in Moscow by the Bolsheviks and repeated on 26 November 1917 in the British Guardian, so that „the British were displaced, the Arabs appalled and the Turks happy.“    The legacy of the agreement has caused too much discontent in the region, particularly among the Denarabern, but also among the Kurds, who were denied an independent state.     The memorandum was forwarded to the Department of Foreign Affairs and circulated for notice. On 16 January, Sykes informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he had spoken to Picot and that he thought Paris could agree.